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APPLYING STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY
TO COMPUTER SOFTWARE
"Hal, I am in command of this ship. I order you to release the manual
hibernation control."
"I'm sorry, Dave, but in accordance with special subroutine
C1435-dash-4, quote, When the crew is dead or incapacitated, the
onboard computer must assume control, unquote. I must, therefore,
overrule your authority, since you are not in any condition to exercise
it intelligently."'
I. INTRODUCTION
The advent of any useful tool can cause cultural change. As one of
our most powerful tools, the computer has created transformations in
our culture that are hard to grasp in their entirety.2 One of these trans-
formations is our inescapable reliance upon computers. As a result of
our dependency, when computer systems malfunction, severe conse-
quences may follow.
Such malfunctions may affect us on many levels, but when malfunc-
tions occur in the context of traffic control, medical services, or the work-
place, the results are sometimes devastating. Imagine an air traffic
controller, guided by a computer system, directing an airliner to land
where another plane is currently taking off. Visualize a computer system
directing a subway train onto tracks already occupied by another train.
Picture an X-ray technician who relies on output from a malfunctioning
computer system and administers an overdose of radiation. Listen to the
horror of the physician who depends on the computer system to monitor
a patient's vital signs and when the system malfunctions, is not given
1. ARTHUR C. CLARKE, 2001 144-45 (1968).
2. Roy N. Freed, Products Liability in the Computer Age, 12 FORUM 461 (1977).
Here are some representatitve [sic] types of computer applications to be aware of:
A wide variety of industrial processes are operated automatically by means of com-
puters, such as oil refining, steel making, chemical manufacture, and food production.
Increasingly, medical procedures are being controlled by computers, including fully-
automatic intensive care units and devices for monitoring such activities as the admin-
istration of anesthesia and providing constant reports to medical personnel. Medical
laboratories perform many analyses automatically by computers. Bridges and other
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adequate warning of the patient's condition. Imagine the worker sub-
jected to nuclear radiation because the monitoring computer system has
malfunctioned.3 These potential tragedies raise important liability
questions.
When such computer breakdowns occur, the potential theories of
recovery are based on contract or tort law. To claim breach of contract,
the victim must allege either a breach of express warranty4 or a breach of
implied warranty.5 However, as several commentators have pointed out,
there are serious drawbacks to both approaches.6 First, the plaintiff must
satisfy the requirements of privity. 7 In most of the scenarios above, the
victim did not purchase the defective software from the manufacturer
and will, therefore, have a difficult time proving privity of contract ex-
isted between the victim and the manufacturer.8 A second difficulty is
the presence of exculpatory clauses, which may act to preclude any re-
covery.9 Finally, there is some question as to whether the UCC applies
3. These examples are substantially based on Susan Nycum, Liability for Malfunction of a
Computer Program, 7 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.L 1 (1979). See generally Michael C.
Gemignani, Product Liability and Software, 8 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 173 (1981).
Gemignani writes that the scenarios predicted by Nycum are probably "too conservative." Id.
If anything, Ms. Nycum's list of hypothetical horribles is too conservative, and it need not
have been limited to hypotheticals. Computer problems have already caused near misses in
the air between crowded passenger jets, the closing of nuclear plants, and the serious waste
of fuel during the last critical moments of Skylab's descent; this fuel might have been
needed to alter the course of re-entry, had that huge satellite been on a collision course
with populated areas. Indeed, a computer failure caused the false alert of another world
war.
Id. (citations omitted).
4. U.C.C. § 2-313 (1989). This code section describes the various ways that express warran-
ties can be created. See John M. Conley, Tort Theories of Recovery Against Vendors of Defective
Software, 13 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 5-6 (1987).
5. U.C.C. § 2-314, which provides for an implied warranty as to merchantability. See Conley,
supra note 4, at 5-6.
6. See Nycum, supra note 3, at 2-8 (1979); Kerry M. Smith, Suing the Provider of Computer
Software" How Courts Are Applying U.C C Article Two, Strict Tort Liablilty, and Professional Mal-
practice, 24 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 743, 745-55 (1988); Note, Computer Programs as Goods Under
the U..CC, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1149 (1979); Bonna L. Horovitz, Computer Software as a Good Under
the Uniform Commercial Code: Taking a Byte Out of the Intangibility Myth, 65 B.U. L. REv. 129
(1985); Lawrence H. Reece III, Defective Expert Systems Raise Personal Injury Liability Issues,
NAT'L L.J., Oct. 12, 1987, at 24.
7. See Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 408 (1852) (citations omitted). But see infra note 8.
8. The requirement of privity for actions based on implied or express warranties has seen some
erosion. See Nycum, supra note 3, at 4 (discussing the decline of the privity requirement in express
warranty actions); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 191 N.E.2d 81 (N.Y. 1963); Greenberg
v. Lorenz, 173 N.E.2d 773, 774-75 (N.Y. 1961); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69
(N.J. 1960). See also William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 791-94 (1966).
9. Conley, supra note 4, at 7-8. The effect of U.C.C. § 2-316 and U.C.C. § 2-202 is that a
written contract with a clause that purports to exclude express warranties and an integration clause
will act to exclude express warranties. Id at 7 n.38.
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to transactions for computer software.10 As a result of these difficulties,
victims often turn to tort theories of recovery.
Various tort theories have either been suggested by commentators 1
or have been tried in the courts, including fraud, 2 negligence,13 and mal-
practice. 4 The limitations of these causes of actions have prompted
some authors to suggest the expansion of strict liability to cover software
manufacturers. '
In the past, software manufacturers have been excluded from the
principles of strict products liability because software evades the label of
product due to its "intangible nature."' 6 Such avoidance, however, may
be short lived. In Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons,'7 the Ninth Circuit indi-
cated in dicta that it might consider expanding the doctrine of strict
products liability to include software manufacturers.'" This pronounce-
ment has caused an uproar among software manufacturers.' 9
This comment will examine the possible expansion of strict products
liability to software manufacturers. Within limits, strict liability for
computer software manufacturers is desirable. Such expansion, however,
10. The UCC applies to "transactions in goods." U.C.C. § 2-102. U.C.C. § 2-105(1) defines
"gods" as:
[A]II things (including specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the time of
identification to the contract for sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid,
investment, securities (Article 8) and things in action. "Goods" also includes the unborn
young of animals and growing crops and other identified things attached to realty as de-
scribed in the section on goods to be severed from realty (Section 2-107).
Id. See also Smith, supra note 6, at 745-55; Conley, supra note 4, at 2-4; Note, supra note 6, at 1149-
50; Horovitz, supra note 6, at 129-30. Compare Data Processing Serv., Inc. v. Smith Oil Corp., 492
N.E.2d 314 (Ind. 1986) (holding that defendant bargained to receive plaintiff's skill and not the end
result which happened to be in the form of a physical medium) with Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v.
Honeywell, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 765 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that contract for the installation of
computer software was primarily a contract for goods and the services provided were incidental),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979), and RRX Indus., Inc. v. LAB-CON,
Inc., 772 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that UCC applies to a computer software system
contract).
11. See, eg., Conley, supra note 4, at 11-32.
12. Eg., Black, Jackson & Simmons Ins. Brokerage, Inc. v. I.B.M. Corp., 440 N.E.2d 282 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1982); see Conley, supra note 4, at 20-23.
13. See Conley, supra note 4, at 15-20.
14. Eg., Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738 (D.N.J. 1979),
rev'd on other grounds, 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980), aff'd after remand, 670 F.2d 1304 (3d Cir.
1981), cert dismissed, 457 U.S. 1112 (1982).
15. Note, Computer Software and Strict Products Liability, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 439 (1983);
Gemignani, supra note 3.
16. See infra notes 64-112 and accompanying text.
17. 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991). See infra notes 101-12 and accompanying text.
18. Winter, 938 F.2d at 1036.
19. See Victoria Slind-Flor, Ruling's Dicta Causes Uproar; Supplier Pulls Software, NAT'L L.J.,
July 29, 1991, at 3.
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should not arbitrarily include all software manufacturers and a consis-
tent method should be used to determine which manufacturers should be
held strictly liable for the software they create. The development of a
new approach to the classification of software as either a product or a
service20 is necessary to the consistent application of strict products
liability.
II. NATURE OF COMPUTERS AND COMPUTER SOFTWARE
In order to evaluate any method of classifying software as a product
or service, some knowledge of computer systems is necessary. At its
most basic level, a computer is an electronic machine that reads informa-
tion, processes it, and reports the output. It is composed of hardware
and software. Hardware is generally considered the physical parts of the
computer such as input devices, the central processing unit, storage de-
vices, and output devices.
This comment focuses on the legal significance of the other compo-
nent of the computer system, the software. Software consists of sets of
instructions (programs) that cause the hardware components to process
the input into a form of output. It is important to understand that this
output does not have to be physical in the sense that you can actually
touch it. For example, the physician that monitors the patient with a
computer may receive the output solely on the computer screen. In fact,
many software programs merely tell other programs what to do and pro-
duce no physical product.
Computer software is usually designed to do a specific task and goes
through several stages of development before it is complete. In one of the
first stages, the programmer meets with the designer21 to determine what
the program should be able to accomplish.22 This process occurs contin-
uously until the program is finished. The programmer then charts ideas
for accomplishing the goals, writes the program down, and codes it into a
tangible medium. Errors can occur at any point in this process. There-
fore, the next process is called "debugging." The designer tests the pro-
gram using simulated input to try to locate any errors, or "bugs,"
contained in the program. Frequently, this is the most time consuming,
20. The applicability of the strict products liability doctrine hinges upon whether the transac-
tion is for products or services. See infra part III.C.I.
21. One person may be both the programmer and the designer.
22. For example, in the production of a program that monitors the vital signs of a patient, the
physician would explain to the programmer what measurements are relevant, the acceptable ranges,
and in what combination.
[VCol. 27:735
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and therefore potentially the most expensive, part of the process.2 3
When the debugging is deemed complete, the program is sold to the end
user.
III. STIcT LIABILITY
This section will include a brief history of the doctrine of strict prod-
ucts liability, the policy reasons supporting the doctrine, and the ele-
ments of strict products liability.
A. History
Strict products liability is a recently expanding field of law and rep-
resents a departure from the common law view. Prior to the doctrine of
strict products liability, the leading common law case, Winterbottom v.
Wright,24 applied the concept of caveat emptor-let the buyer beware.
Winterbottom held that direct privity between the plaintiff and defendant
was necessary to recovery.25 This case reflected the nineteenth century
social view that manufacturers and vendors should not be held responsi-
ble for transactions at a distance involving numerous unknown consum-
ers.26 This social view has since changed and evolved into modem strict
liability.
Ten years after the Winterbottom decision, the first substantial step
in that evolution occurred in Thomas v. Winchester. 7 In Thomas, the
plaintiff purchased medication to give to his sick wife.28 However, the
medication was actually mislabelled poison and as a result the wife be-
came seriously ill.29 The plaintiff brought suit against the distant manu-
facturer and won despite the absence of privity.30 The Thomas court
carved out an exception to the privity requirement for products that were
23. See generally Gemignani, supra note 3, at 185.
24. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
25. The plaintiff, a mail coach driver, was injured by the defendant's inadequate repairs. How-
ever, the defendant contracted to repair the mail coach for the plaintiff's employer and not for the
plaintiff driver. Since there was no privity of contract between the plaintiff and the defendant, the
court found that the plaintiff did not have a cause of action against the defendant. Id. at 403. This
case has been described as a "fishbone in the throat of the law." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTs § 96, at 681 (5th ed. 1984).
26. Winterbottom, 152 Eng. Rep. at 403.
27. 6 N.Y. 397, 408 (1852).
28. Id. at 405.
29. Id. at 398.
30. See id. at 410-11.
1992]
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inherently dangerous.3" This decision led to other inquiries which fur-
ther refined the definition of an imminently or inherently dangerous
product.
32
Attempts to define inherently dangerous became unimportant as the
evolution progressed. 33  In MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,34 Justice
Cardozo "struck through the fog of the 'general rule' and its various
exceptions."'3  Cardozo expanded the definition of an inherently danger-
ous product to any item that is foreseeably dangerous if a component
part of it was defective.36  While MacPherson purported to simply ex-
pand the definition of inherently dangerous products, it actually had the
effect of swallowing up the inherently dangerous rule stated in Thomas.37
Strict liability evolved further in the leading case,38 Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,3 which further eroded the notion that plaintiffs
31. [The distinction is recognized between an act of negligence imminently dangerous to
the lives of others, and one that is not so. In the former case, the party guilty of the
negligence is liable to the party injured, whether there be a contract between them or not;
in the latter, the negligent party is liable only to the party with whom he contracted, and
on the ground that negligence is a breach of contract.
Id. at 410.
32. See, eg., Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Shelton, 282 S.W. 778 (Ky. 1926) (beverage
container); Pillars v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 78 So. 365 (Miss. 1918) (chewing tobacco); Liggett
& Myers Tobacco Co. v. Cannon, 178 S.W. 1009 (Tenn. 1915) (chewing tobacco); Stone v. Van Noy
R.R. News Co., 154 S.W. 1092 (Ky. 1913) (beverage container); Armstrong Packing Co. v. Clem,
151 S.W. 576 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) (soap); Hasbrouck v. Armour & Co., 121 N.W. 157 (Wis. 1909)
(soup).
33. "These [cases that developed the inherently dangerous standard] are now largely of purely
historical interest." KEETON ET AL., supra note 25, § 96, at 682.
34. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
35. The plaintiff, MacPherson, was injured when the spokes of a defective wheel crumbled,
throwing the plaintiff from the car. The plaintiffsued the car manufacturer even though the plaintiff
did not purchase the car directly from the defendant and even though the defendant did not actually
manufacture the wheel. Id. at 1051. The court held that the defendant made a representation of
safety by offering the automobile for sale and therefore assumed a responsibility to the plaintiff. Id.
at 1055. This responsibility rested upon the relation arising from the purchase and not from a rela-
tionship based upon the contract. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 25, § 96, at 683.
36. Justice Cardozo stated:
We hold then, that the principle of Thomas v. Winchester is not limited to poisons, explo-
sives, and things of like nature, to things which in their normal operation are implements
of destruction. If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and
limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger. Its nature gives warning
of the consequences to be expected. If to the element of danger there is added knowledge
that the thing will be used by persons other than the purchaser, and used without new
tests, then, irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty
to make it carefully.
MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053.
37. KEETON ET AL., supra note 25, § 96, at 683.
38. Id. § 97, at 690.
39. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
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needed to be in privity with the defendant manufacturers. In Henning-
sen, the defendant car manufacturer and the defendant dealer were held
strictly liable for a defective automobile to the wife of the actual pur-
chaser." This case opened the floodgate for other claims that overturned
the requirement of privity.41
The erosion of the privity requirement continued in Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, Inc.,42 which involved a defective power tool.43 In
an opinion by Chief Justice Traynor,' the court announced the Green-
man rule,4 5 which allowed for the imposition of strict liability on the
manufacturer without the necessary establishment of a breach of express
warranty under the Uniform Sales Act.
This concept of strict liability was formalized in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts" and has been widely adopted in over thirty-two
40. The Henningsen court stated:
[Me hold that under modern marketing conditions, when a manufacturer puts a new auto-
mobile in the stream of trade and promotes its purchase by the public, an implied warranty
that it is reasonably suitable for use as such accompanies it into the hands of the ultimate
purchaser. Absence of agency between the manufacturer and the dealer who makes the
ultimate sale is immaterial.
Id. at 84.
41. E.g., Simpson v. Powered Prods., Inc., 192 A.2d 555 (Conn. C.P. 1963) (applying strict
liability to a power golf cart); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959)
(applying strict liability to a tire manufacturer). See KEETON ET AL., supra note 25, § 97, at 690.
42. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962).
43. In Greenman, the plaintiff watched a retailer's demonstration of a Shopsmith and read the
brochure prepared by the manufacturer. His wife purchased the Shopsmith as a gift and while the
plaintiff used the product, a piece of wood flew out of the Shopsmith and struck him on the head,
causing the plaintiff serious injuries. After ten months, the plaintiff gave written notice to the manu-
facturer and the retailer of violations of the warranty. He then filed suit against both the retailer and
the manufacturer for negligence and breach of warranty. The manufacturer was held liable for
$65,000 at trial and appealed to the Supreme Court of California. Id. at 898-99.
44. It is interesting to note that Chief Justice Traynor served as an advisor to the writers of
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Ritter v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 283 A.2d 255,
262 (R.I. 1971).
45. 377 P.2d at 900.
A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing
that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury
to a human being. Recognized first in the case of unwholesome food products, such liabil-
ity has now been extended to a variety of other products that create as great or greater
hazards if defective.
Id. (citations omitted).
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]:
§ 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused
to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change
in the condition in which it is sold.
7
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jurisdictions.4 7 The Restatement rule is the clearest statement of strict
liability and is considered the fairest approach to this area.48
B. Policy Reasons Supporting Strict Products Liability
There are several policy reasons that support the imposition of strict
products liability upon distant manufacturers.49 These policy reasons are
critical to any decision on whether strict products liability should be ap-
plied to computer software.
1. Loss Spreading
Risk of loss for personal injury and property damage resulting from
a defective product should be borne by the manufacturers because they
are in a better position to absorb the loss by distributing it as a cost of
doing business.5 0 It is assumed that manufacturers pass this cost on to
the consumers in the form of higher prices and either maintain a cash
reserve that has been set aside for resolutions of any claims or, more
likely, take out insurance policies to cover any claims. This approach
ensures that the costs of an injury do not fall on the unsuspecting injured
consumer. In this manner, those who are injured are adequately com-
pensated while the cost of such compensation is allocated among those
that benefit from the product."1 This particular policy reason may reflect
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the user has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product,
and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any con-
tractual relation with the seller.
Id.
47. The following jurisdictions have adopted the Restatement: Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut,
District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Minne-
sota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont,
Virgin Islands, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§ 16:9, at 21-23 (3d ed. 1987); KEETON ET AL., supra note 25, § 98, at 694 ("nearly all states have
adopted some version of [the Restatement § 402A]").
48. For an explanation of the policy reasons behind the Restatement and a list of the necessary
elements, see infra part III.
49. Eg., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-43 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring); RESTATEMENT, supra note 46, § 402A cmt. c; KEETON ET AL., supra note 25, § 98, at
692-94; John Riper, Strict Liability in Hybrid Cases, 32 STAN. L. REv. 391, 393 (1980); William R.
Russell, Products and the Professional Strict Liability in the Sale-Service Hybrid Transaction, 24
HASTINGs L.J. 111, 117 (1972) (citation omitted); AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§ 16:4, at 15-17 (3d ed. 1987).
50. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 46, § 402A cmt. c; KEETON ET AL., supra note 25, § 98, at
692-93.
51. L. Nancy Birnbaum, Strict Products Liability and Computer Software, 8 COMPUTER/L.J.
135, 141 (1988).
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our social climate of an interdependent technological society.
2. Manufacturer's Representation of Safety
The difficulties involved in discovering potential flaws in a product
force the consumer to rely upon the representations of the manufac-
turer.52 Under strict products liability, a manufacturer assumes a duty of
care in placing the product in the stream of commerce.53 This policy
reflects the reality that consumers rely upon the expertise and perhaps
the reputation of the manufacturer.
3. Safety Incentive
Because the manufacturer has control over product quality, strict
products liability may persuade manufacturers to exercise greater cau-
tion in producing their goods.54 In this manner, manufacturers may real-
ize that it is more cost effective to invest time and money into testing
products than into paying claims for products that were rushed to mar-
ket. For computer software manufacturers, this means investing more
time in debugging. However, because of the very nature of computer
software, it is nearly impossible to detect and prepare for every situation
that might arise.55 Computers are used to do tasks that humans perform,
and in that capacity they attempt to replicate human intuition and judg-
ment. While humans can respond to unforeseeable circumstances, com-
puters lack such a capacity. If circumstances occur that are outside of
the computer's foreseeable, preprogrammed parameters, the computer
program's response will often be unpredictable. A computer program is
only as defect-free as its programmer is prescient. At best, defects can
only be minimized.
52. Escola, 150 P.2d at 443.
As handicrafts have been replaced by mass production with its great markets and transpor-
tation facilities, the close relationship between the producer and consumer of a product has
been altered. Manufacturing processes, frequently valuable secrets, are ordinarily either
inaccessible to or beyond the ken of the general public. The consumer no longer has means
or skill enough to investigate for himself the soundness of a product, even when it is not
contained in a sealed package, and his erstwhile vigilance has been lulled by the steady
devices such as trade-marks.
Id.
53. RESTATEMENT, supra note 46, § 402A cmt. c.
54. Id.; KEETON ET AL., supra note 25, § 98.
55. See Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738 (D.N.J. 1979)
(expert testimony that 40% of all computer installations fail), rev'd on other grounds, 635 F.2d 1081
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C. Requirements of Strict Products Liability
1. Unreasonably Dangerous Product Must Be in a Defective
Condition
According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the product under
consideration must be unreasonably dangerous to the ultimate con-
sumer. 6 Essentially, there are three instances where a product may be
unreasonably dangerous because of a defect. First, a product may be
considered unreasonably dangerous when there is a flaw in the product
that existed when the defendant sold it." In the context of computer
software, such an instance would arise when a programmer fails to code
the program properly, leaving errors in the program. 8 Second, a prod-
uct can be unreasonably dangerous due to a failure of a producer to ade-
quately warn of any hazards.5 9
Finally, a product can be unreasonably dangerous if it is defectively
designed.' A product with a design defect performs exactly as the man-
ufacturer intended but the product does not perform as safely as the cus-
tomer reasonably expects.61 For computer software, manufacturers
should give users adequate information about the limitations of the
software and the parameters under which it operates.
2. Defective Product Must Be Used in a Manner Reasonably
Foreseeable by the Manufacturer
To recover under strict products liability, the injured plaintiff must
have used the product in the normal fashion.62 Furthermore, the prod-
uct must not be defective as a result of any changes made by the con-
sumer. For computer software, this means that for those programs that
require user modification, the manufacturer would not be held liable for
any injuries that stem from such modifications. Presumably, the manu-
facturer would be held liable for injuries resulting solely from the un-
modified portions of the program.
56. RESTATEMENT, supra note 46, § 402A cmt. g. "The rule stated in this Section applies only
where the product is, at the time it leaves the seller's hands, in a condition not contemplated by the
ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him." Id.
57. KEETON ET AL., supra note 25, § 99.
58. Birnbaum, supra note 51, at 139.
59. KEETON ET AL., supra note 25, § 99.
60. IA
61. Birnbaum, supra note 51, at 138.
62. "If the injury results from abnormal handling ... the seller is not liable." RESTATEMENT,
supra note 46, § 402A cmt. h.
[Vol. 27:735
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3. Personal Injury or Property Damage Must Have Been Caused
by the Product
If a defective product is the proximate cause of personal injury or
property damage, the manufacturer may be held strictly liable. How-
ever, purely economic loss cannot be recovered in strict products liabil-
ity.63 Policy dictates that economic harm should be pursued through
other avenues because purely economic harm is not as damaging as
either personal injury or property damage." This exception is an impor-
tant limit on the usefulness of strict products liability.65
4. Sale Must Be of a Product
The major premise of strict products liability is that a product is
defective. This is important because the policy reasons supporting strict
products liability66 do not apply with the same force to the sale of serv-
ices. First, service providers, unlike product manufacturers, are usually
63. KEETON ET AL., supra note 25, § 101, at 708.
Where products do not have defects that endanger others, it can be reasonably argued that
they cannot be so poor in quality as to be unworthy of sale if the price is right.... Histori-
cally, therefore, the only tort action available to a disappointed purchaser suffering intangi-
ble commercial loss has been the tort action of deceit for fraud and the only contract action
has been for breach of a warranty, express or implied. This remains the generally accepted
view.
Id. (citations omitted).
64. David A. Hall, Strict Products Liability and Computer Software: Caveat Vendor, 4 Com-
PutER/L.J. 373, 390 (1983).
Liability without fault is a potentially onerous burden to place on a party, notwithstanding
questions of causation. Normally, courts are reluctant to intrude into the dealings of indi-
viduals, and would prefer that the parties work out mutually satisfactory compromises on
their own. When physical injury occurs there is more at stake than a group of dissatisfied
individuals. There is a possibility of widespread societal effects such as pain, trauma, suf-
fering, and fear, in addition to economic effects such as medical costs, insurance fees, lost
wages, and business instability. Likewise, destruction of property is more significant than
the loss of a bargain. Physical harm, then, is a significant enough consequence that an
intrusion into individual liberty in the form of government legislation and adjudication of
liability is appropriate.
Id.
65. Conley, supra note 4, at 28.
From the perspective of a typical computer plaintiff, the principal shortcoming of § 402A
is the requirement of personal injury or physical damage. With few exceptions, courts have
declined to permit the recovery of pure economic loss on a strict liability theory ...
'IThere is no question that the greater part of the citadel of privity in products liability
cases remains intact. With some exceptions, litigants alleging economic loss, instead of
personal injury or property damage, are still without any remedy when they lack privity of
contract with the defendant.'
Id. (quoting Baz Edmeades, The Citadel Stands: The Recovery of Economic Loss in American Prod-
ucts Liability, 27 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 647, 648 (1977)).
66. See supra part III.B for a discussion of policy reasons. See infra part IV for a discussion of
the meaning of product.
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in the business of providing expert knowledge to individual customers,
which precludes providers from having high volume.17 This lack of vol-
ume means that the costs of defects are distributed among fewer people.
Second, victims of defective service usually deal directly with the service
provider and are in a much better position to prove negligence than a
victim of a defective product made by some distant manufacturer.6 8
Third, in the sale of services, the consumer is not forced to blindly rely
upon the provider's representation about the product, but instead expects
the exercise of expert care.69 Fourth, the service provider does not have
the control that a manufacturer of products does. The provider cannot
run a battery of tests in an assembly line to determine if the service is
defective.70 Additionally, the victim of a defective service is usually in
privity of contract with the service provider and can resolve the issue in
one suit under a contract recovery theory.7 1
Given these different policy justifications, a plaintiff pursuing strict
products liability must satisfy the threshold requirement of establishing
that the item in question is a product. This raises the critical question: Is
computer software a product?
IV. Is COMPUTER SOFTWARE A SALE OF A PRODUCT OR A
SERVICE?
The Restatement provides examples of sales of products, 7 2 but this
list is useless when considering "hybrid" items like computer software.
A brief tour of the history of the sales/service dichotomy and relevant
statutory definitions will help determine whether computer software is a
product or a service.
A. Historical Case Law Treatment of Sales v. Services
1. English Cases
A distinction between sales and services first developed in England
in the context of the Statute of Frauds, 73 which was originally intended
to protect defendants from false claims.74 In England, contracts for the
67. See La Rossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937, 942 (3d Cir. 1968).




72. RESTATEMENT, supra note 46, § 402A cmt. d.
73. Russell, supra note 49, at 113-14.
74. Id. at 114 (citing J. BAKER, THE LAW OF SALES §§ 2-3 (1887)).
[Vol. 27:735
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sale of goods were required to be in writing to satisfy the Statute of
Frauds, while contracts for the performance of services were not.75 Ac-
cordingly, the "essence test" was developed.76 This test asked whether
the essence of the contract was the work or the materials supplied.77
Similarly, the "English Rule" developed,78 which distinguished between
contracts which resulted in resalable tangible goods and contracts where
no resalable tangible goods were produced. 9
By 1933, England began to abandon the sales/service distinction for
products liability cases. In G.H. Meyers & Co. v. Brent Cross Service
Co.,"° the court found that the contract was for services but imposed an
implied warranty of fitness on the goods provided as a part the services.81
After Meyers, English courts generally abandoned the sales/service
distinction.82
2. American Cases
American courts were more reticent in abandoning the sales/service
distinction. American courts have separated those transactions that are
primarily commercial from those that are primarily professional.8 3 This
professional/commercial test is relatively easy to apply. If the defendant
is recognized as a professional and the transaction arose out of the de-
fendant's exercise of that professional skill, the transaction is professional
in nature; otherwise it is presumed to be a commercial transaction.84
This determination is simple if the defendant is a recognized professional
such as an attorney, doctor, engineer, or architect. However, not all de-
fendants are easily categorized. What about a computer programmer
75. Id.
76. This test was introduced in the leading case of Clay v. Yates, 156 Eng. Rep. 1123 (Ex.
1856). In that case, a contract to print five hundred copies of a treatise was held to be a contract for
services. The court reasoned that the printer's labor and skill had a higher value than the materials
on which the treatise was to be printed. Id.
77. Id. at 1125.
78. This test was first developed in Lee v. Griffith, 121 Eng. Rep. 716 (K.B. 1861).
79. Id. at 718.
80. 1 K.B. 46 (1933). In that case, the plaintiff entrusted his car to the defendant who installed
six rods that were provided by the manufacturer. When one rod broke, causing damage to the car,
the plaintiff sued the defendant for breach of implied warranty. Although the contract was primarily
for the provision of services, the court imposed liability for the implied warranty with respect to the
rods. See Russell, supra note 49, at 114-15.
81. Meyers, I K.B. at 51.
82. Russell, supra note 49, at 114-15.
83. See La Rossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1968); Schipper v. Levitt &
Sons, Inc., 207 A.2d 314 (N.J. 1965); Gagne v. Bertran, 275 P.2d 15 (Cal. 1954).
84. See Russell, supra note 49, at 116.
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possessing a high degree of expertise in the field of programming?85
Some American cases have utilized the English essence test. For
example, in Allied Properties v. John A. Blume & Assoc.,86 the court
stated that when "the primary objective of a transaction is to obtain serv-
ices, the doctrines of implied warranty and strict liability do not
apply." 8
7
At least one American court used a case-by-case application of the
policies supporting strict products liability to determine if the transaction
in question was the sale of a product or the rendition of a service. In
Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,88 the court considered whether a hospi-
tal should be held strictly liable for its administrative and mechanical
services. 89
There are inherent dangers in the case-by-case approach.90 While a
case-by-case approach might seem desirable because of its individual de-
termination, such an approach lacks consistency, making it difficult for
manufacturers to predict with some certainty their rights and
responsibilities. 91
85. At least one court has dealt with whether a computer programmer is a professional. In
Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738 (D.N.J. 1979), rev'd on other
grounds, 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980), aff'd after remand, 670 F.2d 1304 (3d Cir. 1981), cert.
dismissed, 457 U.S. 1112 (1982). In that case, the plaintiff asserted a new tort:
The novel concept of a new tort called "computer malpractice" is premised upon a theory
of elevated responsibility on the part of those who render computer sales and service.
Plaintiff equates the sale and servicing of computer systems with established theories of
professional malpractice. Simply because an activity is technically complex and important
to the business community does not mean that greater potential liability must attach. In
the absence of sound precedential authority, the court declines the invitation to create a
new tort.
Id. at 740 n.1.
86. 102 Cal. Rptr. 259 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972).
87. Id. at 264 (citation omitted).
88. 355 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
89. Id. at 1066. The court discussed the loss spreading policy justification for strict products
liability. Judge Reynolds weighed two policy arguments to determine whether the hospital should
be exempt. One argument asserted that it is in the public interest to promote the proper perform-
ance of hospitals. On the other hand, hospitals should be excepted because they are generally chad-
table institutions and are therefore not able to allocate the loss. In his opinion, Judge Reynolds
noted that hospitals tend to be a profitable industry; therefore, hospitals should not be automatically
exempted. Rather, each case should be viewed separately in the context of the policy reasons sup-
porting application of strict products liability. Id. at 1066-67.
My decision should not be based on a technical or artificial distinction between sales and
services. Rather, I must determine if the policies which support the imposition of strict
tort liability would be furthered by its imposition in this case. In the present context, the
question is whether it is in the public interest for the consumer/patient or the supplier/
hospital to bear the loss incurred by defective, though non-negligent, services.
Id. at 1066.
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In summary, while American courts have not totally rejected the
sales/service dichotomy, they certainly have not shown any consistency
in making this classification. 92
B. Statutory Definitions
Statutory guidance on the definition of a product is scarce. In 1979,
the Department of Commerce created the Model Uniform Product Lia-
bility Act (MUPLA).93 For purposes of the MUPLA, a product is "any
object possessing intrinsic value, capable of delivery either as an assem-
bled whole or as a component part... [which is] produced for introduc-
tion into . . . commerce." 94 Thus far, however, only Idaho95 and
Washington96 have adopted the MUPLA definition of a product.97
Perhaps a more helpful statute, by analogy, is the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (UCC) which applies to "goods." 98 Under the UCC,
courts are more willing to allow recovery for contracts that have ele-
ments of service and sales, also known as hybrid contracts. In Bonebrake
v. Cox,99 the court decided that the UCC applied to a contract for a
bowling alley even though the contract required substantial labor."°°
RRX Industries, Inc. v. LAB-CON, Inc., l"' a 1985 case which applied the
UCC to the sale of a computer system, should give computer software
manufacturers a reason to pause. In RRX Industries, the Ninth Circuit
adopted a combination of the case-by-case analysis and the essence test,
finding that the UCC applied to computer software.10 2 Lab-Con con-
tracted to provide RRX with a software system for use in its medical
92. See generally Russell, supra note 49.
93. § 102(c), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979).
94. Id.
95. IDAHO CODE § 6-1402(3) (1980).
96. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.010(3) (West Supp. 1991).
97. AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16:68, at 90 (3d ed. 1987).
98. For a definition of "goods," see supra note 10.
99. 499 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1974).
100. The Bonebrake court stated:
[U.C.C. § 2-105] is divided into two parts, the first affirmative, defining the scope and reach
of Article 2, the second negative, excluding certain transactions. To come within the af-
firmative section, the articles (the "things") must be movable, and the movability must
occur at the time of identification to the contract.... They are not the less "goods" within
the definition of the act because service may play a role in their ultimate use. The Code
contains no such exception.
Id. at 958.
101. 772 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985).
102. In determining whether a contract is one of sale or to provide services we look to the
essence of the agreement. When a sale predominates, incidental services provided do not
alter the basic transaction. Because software packages vary depending on the needs of the
individual consumer, we apply a case-by-case analysis.
1992]
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laboratories1 x3 According to the contract, Lab-Con would correct any
bugs that arose in the system."° Soon after installation, defects appeared
that could not be remedied, despite numerous telephone contacts and a
system upgrade. As a result, RRX sued Lab-Con for breach of con-
tract.105 The Ninth Circuit considered such services as "employee train-
ing, repair services, and system upgrading," but concluded that the
transaction was predominately one for a good. Therefore, the California
Commercial Code applied to the transaction.106
C. Recent Developments
Perhaps more threatening to software manufacturers is the dicta
contained in the 1991 Ninth Circuit decision, Winter v. G.P. Putnam's
Sons.°10 The case involved a strict products liability claim for the sale of
a book containing erroneous information.10 The plaintiffs urged the
Ninth Circuit to equate information contained in a "how-to" book to
information contained in aeronautical charts." 9 In rejecting this com-
parison, the Winter court differentiated between the book and the aero-
nautical chart by focusing on the technical nature of aeronautical
charts.110
In support of its position on aeronautical charts, the court cited a
California case, Fluor Corp. v. Jeppesen & Co.,III which found that such
charts were products for purposes of strict liability." 2 Like the court in
RRX Industries, the Fluor court utilized a case-by-case analysis by apply-
ing one of the major policy reasons for strict liability-loss shifting.'
The Fluor court found that the paramount policy of loss spreading would
best be served by characterizing the charts as a product.'14 Significantly,
the Winter court went on to state that computer software may also be a
Id. at 546 (citations omitted).




107. 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991).
108. Id. Relying on an reference book containing information regarding the edibility of mush-
rooms, two "mushroom enthusiasts" ingested wild mushrooms and suffered severe physical ailments
as a result. Both required liver transplants. Id. at 1033-34.
109. Id. at 1035-36.
110. Id. at 1036.
111. 216 Cal. Rptr. 68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
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product for purposes of strict products liability. 15 If followed, Winter
could open the door to strict liability for computer software
manufacturers.
V. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
Such willingness to consider software as a product was foreseeable.
Commentators have suggested various approaches to the treatment of
computer software.
A. Expansion of Strict Liability to Include Products and Services
Some commentators have urged that the doctrine of strict liability
be enlarged to include both products and services, thus encompassing all
computer software. 1 6 They point out that the distinction is sometimes
meaningless and leads to contorted opinions. I 7 Such an all-inclusive ap-
proach has the benefit of simplicity; any discussion about the nature of
software would become moot. However, this approach has serious
problems. It does not support the policies advanced to support strict
products liability. As noted earlier, providers of services, among other
limitations, do not usually have the ability to distribute the costs among a
class of consumers.11 8
This all-inclusive approach fails on other policy grounds as well. If
this broad sweep of liability for products and services were allowed to
develop, many software manufacturers would be inappropriately caught
up. For instance, a programmer who is hired to come into a company
and perform the service of writing a specific program for the company
should only be held liable for his negligence, not strictly liable for any
defects that he could not have foreseen.
115. Winter, 938 F.2d at 1036.
Aeronautical charts are highly technical tools. They are graphic depictions of technical,
mechanical data. The best analogy to an aeronautical chart is a compass. Both may be
used to guide an individual who is engaged in an activity requiring certain knowledge of
natural features. Computer software that fails to yield the result for which it was designed
may be another. (emphasis added). In contrast, [the book in question] is like a book on
how to use a compass or an aeronautical chart. The chart itself is like a physical "product"
while the "How to Use" book is pure thought and expression.
Id. (citations omitted).
116. E.g., Russell, supra note 49, at 113, 132.
117. Id.
118. Supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
19921
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B. Total Rejection of Expansion to Include Software
Other commentators have urged that software be exempt from strict
liability.119 To support this position, they point to the intangible nature
of software.120 However, as Winter 121 and RRX Industries 122 demon-
strate, this line of reasoning may be rejected. Computer software is not
sufficiently intangible to be exempt from strict products liability. Also,
there are some software manufacturers who are in a position to spread
the loss, detect errors, and who make representations as to quality.
C. Happy Middle-Ground
Because strict products liability only applies to the sale of prod-
ucts,123 consideration must be given to the various ways in which
software is sold. Frequently, this sale includes not only the computer
software, but hardware and other services. This bundled transaction fur-
ther complicates analysis of whether a particular sale is a product. Also,
software programs can be transmitted by the sale of hardware that con-
tains preprogrammed software, such as a computer board or computer
chip. More often, software is sold off-the-shelf to mass audiences. Yet, it
is fairly common for software to be custom made for the user.
An ideal analysis would differentiate between those software manu-
facturers that satisfy the policy grounds for imposition of strict liability
and those that do not satisfy the policy grounds, while avoiding a case-
by-case application of policy. The analysis should focus on the nature of
the software itself to see which types of software best satisfy the policy
arguments behind strict liability.
The easiest software to classify as products is the off-the-shelf
software and the software that is preprogrammed into hardware. Both of
these items are mass-produced and sent off to unknown consumers who
are forced to rely upon the representations of the manufacturers.
Although the skill necessary to create this item is high, the item is not
necessarily provided by a professional.' 24 The manufacturer has control
over product quality before it leaves the factory and the manufacturer is
selling the software programs on a large scale. The manufacturer is in
the best position to absorb the costs of loss spreading. Off-the-shelf
119. E.g., Freed, supra note 2, at 467-71.
120. Id. at 469.
121. 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991).
122. 772 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985).
123. See infra part III.C.4.
124. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 27:735
18
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 27 [1991], Iss. 4, Art. 12
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol27/iss4/12
SOFTWARE LIABILITY
software and software that is preprogrammed into hardware look like
any other item that is considered a product for purposes of strict prod-
ucts liability. 125
At the other end of the spectrum, a custom made piece of software
should properly be viewed as a service. Instead of a remote, inaccessible
producer, custom made software is manufactured by an immediate pro-
ducer who is performing a service for the consumer. The policy reasons
supporting the application of strict products liability to off-the-shelf
software manufacturers do not support application of strict product lia-
bility to services such as custom made software. First, the provider of
custom made software usually does not deal in high volume and cannot
spread the risk of loss among many consumers. 126 Second, one who is
injured due to defective custom made software is better able to prove
negligence than the purchaser of the off-the-shelf software manufac-
turer. 127 Third, the purchasers of custom made software contract for the
expertise of the software designer and not because of representations of
the designer. Finally, the designer of custom made software does not
have the advantage of safety tests aimed at assembly line production.
Careful attention must be paid to what is meant by custom made.
The sale of a standard program that is accompanied by services for train-
ing or technical support are considered in the same category as off-the-
shelf software. But if the manufacturer either writes a program from
scratch or alters a skeleton program, that manufacturer has custom made
that program. The service rendered must in some way change the actual
program.'28 An application of this approach in the RRX Industries "9
situation would lead the court to the same result, but for better reasons.
Instead of focusing on the essence of the contract, the discussion should
focus on the essence of the service provided by asking whether the service
altered the program. Finally, such a distinction serves as a happy middle
ground to the previous extreme approaches of either total expansion or
total exclusion.
125. For purposes of this analysis, therefore, a computerized aeronautical chart is as much a
product as the same chart that was once reproduced on paper.
126. See supra part III.C.4.
127. Such plaintiffs may also pursue a breach of contract action.
128. To change the actual computer program, alterations must be beyond "bells and whistles"
(color of screen, types of warning bells, etc.).
129. 772 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985).
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VI. POTENTIAL DIFFICULTIES WITH THE HAPPY MIDDLE GROUND
This middle ground approach, which calls for the differentiation
among types of software, has the potential to create other difficulties for
the application of strict products liability. This approach lacks the sim-
plicity of either total expansion or total exclusion. In order to determine
whether strict products liability is applicable, the software package will
have to fall neatly within one of the categories of prepackaged software,
software preprogrammed into hardware, or custom made software.
While these categories may seem artificial, analysis based on this
approach will focus on the nature of the software itself. By maintaining
such a focus, courts are relieved of a case-by-case analysis and its inher-
ent inconsistency. 130 The consistency that the middle ground provides
far outweighs the advantage of other alternative approaches.
VII. RAMIFICATIONS
If strict products liability is expanded to include certain software
manufacturers, it should be done by following the middle ground ap-
proach described above. However, the move toward expanded liability
should be made with great hesitancy so that the effects of such social
engineering can be weighed.
Computer software may be threatening because the average citizen
mistrusts these machines. The computer's reputation has certainly taken
a beating. Movies depict computers taking control of humans. 1' All
types of mistakes are now attributed to computer error.132 Almost every-
one has been forced to wait for some important transaction because "the
computer is down."
However, these encounters actually illustrate how important com-
puters have become in our society. We are now able to do things with
computers that were never possible before their development. For exam-
ple, although computer malfunctions in the medical profession can be
extremely alarming, computer programs have allowed for better and
more accurate practice of medicine. 13
3
130. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
131. See eg., 2001 (Metro-Goldwin-Mayer 1978).
132. This phrase is very misleading. A computer program is merely a set of instructions created
and used by people. If an employee dug a hole deeper than was proper, it would be absurd to claim
that the inaccuracy of the hole is due to the shovel. Computers, like shovels, are merely tools and
are only as good as their human users and creators.
133. Freed, supra note 2, at 462, 464.
[Vol. 27:735
20
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 27 [1991], Iss. 4, Art. 12
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol27/iss4/12
SOFTWARE LIABILITY
In fact, increased reliance upon computer technology has given hu-
mankind a glimpse at a technological revolution that will rival the indus-
trial revolution in its impact on society. It is through the use of
computers that we are now able to perform important tasks with greater
precision, accuracy and speed."' New ideas need no longer be tested by
costly trial and error. Computer simulations and models can test the
idea while the designer sits in her chair.
Additionally, the continued growth of computer technology has im-
portant political effects. Computer systems help gain access to a critical
source of political power-knowledge. As more and more of the general
populace has greater access to computers, information will have to be
shared by a larger percentage of the body politic. While measuring such
an effect is necessarily difficult, this may prove to be one of the more
significant consequences of the explosion of the computer era.
Computers have improved our lives in many ways. The imposition
of strict products liability may have a chilling effect on the creation of
new advances in computers. If other courts follow the Ninth Circuit's
suggestion, they should consider the possible ramifications of the policy
they create.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The possible application of strict products liability to computer
software is only one example of the strain that new and future technolog-
ical advances will place on our legal system. Our legal system is designed
for slow, careful examination of legal issues with some opportunity to
revise the structure with the benefit of hindsight. However, technology is
progressing at a dizzying pace, embarking on new territories that the
legal system has not contemplated. In short, the legal system is in danger
of being left behind in a haze of confusion.
The current debate over strict liability for computer software is a
good illustration of this confusion. In time, the very existence of com-
puter software will force lawmakers to reevaluate the entire doctrine of
strict products liability because the doctrine is founded upon a simple
fallacy. It assumes that everything can be classified as primarily a tradi-
tional product or traditional service. Despite all the analytical agonizing,
134. See Diane B. Lawrence, Strict Liability, Computer Software and Medicine: Public Policy at
the Crossroads, 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 1, 17-18 (1987). "Rather than protecting the consumer from
unsafe products, strict liability may drive vital products from the market and cause severe harm to
the health and welfare of the public." Id.; Freed, supra note 2, at 462, 464.
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computer software refuses to fit nicely into either category. This refusal
to be placed into an old box should signal the legal system that there are
additional boxes other than product and service. As technology contin-
ues to grow, so too must our willingness to view technology for what it
is-a challenge to our outdated legal framework.
Michael R. Maule
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